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INTRODUCTION

Ever since the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Sell v. United
States,' there has been a cottage industry of commentary on the
question of whether the state can medicate an incompetent
defendant for the purpose of making him or her competent to
stand trial.2 Sell, however, was not the first important case to
deal with this question-the now, mostly-lost-in-the-dustbin-oflegal-history case of United States v. Charters' set out virtually
every important legal argument over a decade before Sell; the
U.S. Capitol shooting case of United States v. Weston4 assured
that casual watchers of Action News broadcasts would have some
idea as to the scope of the underlying issues, and, of course, the
Supreme Court's radically different decisions in Washington v.
Harper'-on the refusal rights of prisoners-and of Riggins v.
Nevada6-on the refusal rights of competent insanity pleadersassured that this question would be a staple on law school exams
in perpetuity.
Moreover, there have been multiple cases interpreting Sell
broadly and narrowly, both in the context of medication issues
and in the context of other treatments.' Because of the vagueness
of certain terminology, questions such as what a "serious" crime
is,' what "substantially" meant to the Court in Sell,' and how the
1 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

2 See 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN
LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL

& HEATHER

ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY

§ 8A-4.2c(1), 21, 29 n.369.43, 30 n.369.53, § 8A-4.2d,

30-31 n.372 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 2014).
See 829 F.2d 479, 490 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988)
(en banc).
4 255 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990).
6 504 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1992).
See, e.g., PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 2, at 27-29 n. 369.41 (citations
omitted).
8 Professor Christopher Slobogin believes it means "any" felony. See

Christopher Slobogin, Sell's Conundrums: The Right of Incompetent Defendants
to Refuse Anti-Psychotic Medication, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1523, 1539 (2012); cf.
Brandy M. Rapp, Sell v. United States: InvoluntaryAdministration of
Antipsychotic Medication to CriminalDefendants, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 1047, 1071
(2004) (criticizing the Court for failing to define and clarify key terms that
potentially could result in inappropriate administration of drugs with

irreversible harmful side effects). But see David M. Siegel, Involuntary
PsychotropicMedication to Competence: No Longer an Easy Sell, 12 MICH. ST. U.
J. MED. & L. 1, 8 (2008) (discussing cases deemed "not serious", including
possession of firearms by a person previously committed to a mental health
institute and illegal reentry to the United States).

2015]

"YOU MIGHT HAVE DRUGS AT YOUR COMMAND"

383

least intrusive alternative doctrine was supposed to be applied in
such caseso have all been considered by later federal and state
courts, with the predictable range of decisions.
These issues have been discussed and reconsidered in multiple
arenas from the scholarly literature-both legal and behavioralto professional conferences and to law school classes and other
academic settings. Two seemingly unrelated issues, however,
have been the subject of virtually no consideration at all, and we
are raising both of these so as to jog readers into thinking about
these questions when they reflect on Sell's limits and its potential
reach. One of these relates to a topic that one of us (MLP) has
been writing about and talking about extensively in recent years:
that of the application of international human rights law to the
forensic process in all its aspects, especially the potential impact
of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities ("CRPD")." The other is a topic that, to the best of
our knowledge, no one has written about. One of us (1VILP)
discusses it yearly with students in his Criminal Procedure:
Adjudication course, but there is still nothing in the literature
about it: what happens when a wealthy person, able to make bail
on any bailable crime, is in the community pending trial, and
becomes incompetent to stand trial (or even, perhaps, was always
incompetent)?
We know the impact of bail on subsequent
convictions and lengths of sentence; 2 yet, there is-again, to the
9 Thus, Robert Cochrane and his colleagues note that "substantially likely"
was not defined in Sell, but they draw on cases in other areas of the law to
conclude that, most likely, it is akin to "clear and convincing evidence." See
Robert Cochrane et al., The Sell Effect: Involuntary Medication Treatment Is a
"Clearand Convincing" Success, 37 LAW & HUm. BEHAV. 107, 107 (2013), relying
on, inter alia, United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2002), vacated in
light of Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
10 See, e.g., Dina E. Klepner, Sell v. United States: Is the Supreme Court
Giving a Dose of Bad Medicine?: The Constitutionalityof the Right to Forcibly
Medicate Mentally Ill Defendants for Purposes of Trial Competence, 32 PEPP. L.
REV. 727, 749 (2005) (stating that a less intrusive manner would be a court
order supported with contempt sanctions); id. at n.169 (suggesting other
alternatives including verbal psychotherapy and behavior modification
techniques).
I Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006). See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE

SILENCED ARE HEARD 143-59 (2012).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. 320, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
("Even where all other factors are held constant, studies indicate that detention
increases the chances of harsher and longer sentences."); State v. Johnson, 294
A.2d 245, 251 n.6 (N.J. 1972) ("[An accused who has been detained in jail
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best of our knowledge-nothing on this question whatsoever. We
discuss both of these, and also look at the second issue through
the filter of therapeutic jurisprudence.
The title of this paper draws on Bob Dylan's song Gotta Serve
Somebody, from Slow Train Coming, the first album of his
gospel/born again period. The lyric I am using comes from this
verse:
You
You
You
They

might be a rock 'n' roll addict prancing on the stage
might have drugs at your command, women in a cage
may be a businessman or some high-degree thief
may call you Doctor or they may call you Chief

But you're gonna have to serve somebody, yes indeed
You're
gonna
have
to
serve
somebody
Well, it may be the devil or it may be the Lord
But you're gonna have to serve somebody'3
According to Michael Gray, one of the most prominent of Dylan
scholars, the song urges that "moral shiftiness be renounced in
favour of clear-sightedness about a clear and unavoidable
choice." 4 Defendants who are incompetent to stand trial often
are deprived of their rights to make such "clear" choices, though
the consequences are often "unavoidable."
I. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
We must begin with a consideration of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)." Although the
United States has signed, but not yet ratified, this Convention,'"
it is necessary that we take this Convention seriously in all
matters that relate to the intersection of international human

between his arraignment and the final adjudication of his case is more likely to
receive a criminal conviction or jail sentence than an accused who has been free
on bail."). See generally Anne Rankin, The Effect of PretrialDetention, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 641, 641-43, 655 (1964) (showing a connection between
continuous detention and unfavorable outcomes, such as conviction).
"' BOB DYLAN, Gotta Serve Somebody, on SLOw TRAIN COMING (Columbia
Records 1979) (lyrics availableat http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/gotta-servesomebody).
14 MICHAEL GRAY, THE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 272 (2008).

See G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 11, ¶ 2.
Convention and Optional Protocol Signaturesand Ratifications, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/disabilities/countries.asp?navid=17&pid=166 (last
visited Feb. 5, 2015).
'1

16
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rights law and criminal procedure.
There is no question that the CRPD is the most revolutionary
international human rights document ever created that applies to
persons with disabilities. 7 It furthers the human rights approach
to disability-endorsing a social model and repudiating a purely
medical model-and recognizes the right of people with
disabilities to equality in nearly every aspect of life." Although
little attention has been paid to its potential impact on forensic
patients," we believe it is essential that there be a new focus
notwithstanding the fact that virtually no consideration of the
Convention's application to this population yet appears in the
literature.20
The state of the law as it relates to persons with disabilities
must be radically reconsidered, especially in regards to forensic
populations.2' Within the context of its human rights approach,
the Disability Convention firmly endorses a social model of
disability and re-conceptualizes mental health rights as disability
rights-a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that
traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability law.22 "The

&

'" See generally PERLIN, supra note 11, at 4-5, 16-19; Michael L. Perlin
Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution and Contemporary

Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION, PRAXIS, AND

COURAGE 80, 85 (Michael Dudley et al. eds. 2008); Michael L. Perlin,'A Change
Is Gonna Come:" The Implications of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilitiesfor the Domestic Practiceof Constitutional
Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 484 (2009).
8 See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting through the Lens of
Mental Disability: The ProposedInternationalConvention on Protectionand
Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities,41 STAN. J.
INT'L. L. 181, 191, 193, 196 (2005).
' But see Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, "You That Hide Behind
Walls:" The Relationship Between the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilitiesand the Convention Against Torture and the Treatment of
InstitutionalizedForensicPatients, in TORTURE IN HEALTH-CARE SETTINGS:
REFLECTIONS ON THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE'S 2013 THEMATIC REPORT

195, 216 (2013); Michael L. Perlin & Alison Lynch, "Toilingin the Danger and in
the Morals of Despair:"Risk, Security, Danger, the Constitution, and the
Clinician'sDilemma, 26 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming 2015).
20 Perlin & Schriver, supra note 19, at 201-02.
21 See generally Perlin, supra note 17, at 489 (noting that the involvement
of
stakeholders, i.e. consumers and users of psychiatric services, is critical to
developing disability rights).
22 Phil Fennell, Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental Disorder, 27 MED. & L.
95, 106-07 (2008). See generally Michael L. Perlin, "AbandonedLove:" The
Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Intersection between InternationalHuman
Rights and Domestic Mental DisabilityLaw, 35 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 121, 139
(2011).
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Convention . . sketches the full range of human rights that apply
to all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives
of persons with disabilities."23
It provides a framework for
ensuring that mental health laws "fully recognise the rights of
those with mental illnesses[,]"24 and mandates prescriptive rights
in addition to proscriptive rights.2 5 There is no question that it
"has ushered in a new era of disability rights policy.""
Furthermore, the Convention describes disability as a condition
arising from "interaction with various barriers [that] may
hinder ...
[an individual's] full and effective participation in
society on an equal basis with others" instead of inherent
limitations,2 7 and extends existing human rights to take into
account the specific rights experiences of persons with
disabilities.2 8 It calls for "respect for inherent dignity"29 and "nondiscrimination."30 Subsequent articles declare "freedom from
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or

Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, Social Rights and the Relational
Value of the Rights to Participatein Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 249, 256 (2009); see also Ron McCallum, The United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:Some Reflections (The Univ. of Sydney,
Sydney L. School 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563883.
24 Bernadette McSherry, InternationalTrends in Mental Health Laws:
Introduction, 26 LAW IN CONTEXT 1, 8 (2008).
25 Prescriptive rights require certain conduct, whereas proscriptive rights
forbid particular behavior. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert Testimony by
Ethicists: What Should be The Norm?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 198, 200 (2005);
see Robert J. Quinn, Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty
for the Human Rights Violations of a PriorRegime: Chile's New Model, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 905, 920 (1994) (noting the significance of the inclusion of
proscriptive and prescriptive rights in human rights treaties in general);
Michael L. Perlin, The Significance of the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities- And Why It Demands the Creation of an Asian/Pacific
DisabilityRights Tribunal, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE KANAGAWA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL STUDIES (2014) (manuscript at 9), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2512846&download=yes
(explaining the significance of both proscriptive and prescriptive rights in the
CRPD context in specific).
26 Paul Harpur, Time to Be Heard:How Advocates Can Use the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilitiesto Drive Change, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1271,
1295 (2011).
27 G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 11, art. 1, pmbl., ¶ e; PERLIN, supra note 11, at
144.
28 PERLIN, supra note 11, at 144; Fr~deric Mdgret, The Disabilities
Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilitiesor DisabilityRights?, 30
HUm. RTS. Q. 494, 515 (2008).
29 G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 11, art. 3(a).
30 Id. at art. 3(b).
23
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punishment,"' "freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse,"32
and a right to protection of the "integrity of the person.""
Although the United States has not yet ratified the CRPD,
President Obama signed the Convention over five years ago.
Under such circumstances, "a state's obligations under it are
controlled by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties ...
which requires signatories 'to refrain from acts which would
defeat the Disability Convention's object and purpose."'"
Domestic courts in New York have thus cited the CRPD
approvingly in cases involving guardianship matters.36 In one
such case, Surrogate Judge Kristen Booth Glen, noted that the
CRPD was entitled to "'persuasive weight' in interpreting our
own laws and constitutional protections."
Importantly, other international human rights law documents

3

32

Id. at art. 15.

Id. at art. 16.

11 Id. at art. 17.
See Michelle Diament, Obama Urges Senate to Ratify Disability Treaty,
DISABILITY ScooP (May 18, 2012),
http://www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/18/Obama-Urges-Senate-Treaty/15654/.
The Senate failed to ratify the CRPD on December 4, 2012, for lack of a supermajority of votes. See The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
U.S. INT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITIES, http://usicd.org/index.cfm/crpd (last visited
Mar. 3, 2015). The Democratic leadership promised to bring the Convention up
again for ratification in 2013. See Michael L. Perlin, "Yonder Stands Your
Orphan with His Gun" The InternationalHuman Rights and Therapeutic
JurisprudenceImplications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 301, 305 n.19 (2013).
3
See In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (Sur. Ct. 2010) (citing Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treatises art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331),
as discussed in Henry Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of
Representing Clients with Limited Competency in GuardianshipProceedings, 4
ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 331, 362-63 (2011).
36 See, e.g., Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d at 435 (holding due process required
that the guardianship appointment be subject to a requirement of periodic
reporting and review); In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854
(Sur. Ct. 2012) (holding that substantive due process requirement of adherence
to principal of least restrictive alternative applied to guardianships sought for
mentally persons). There is nothing new or radical about the use of
international human rights law in U.S. courts. See generally Michael W. Lewis
& Peter Margulies, Interpretationsof lHL in Tribunals of the United States, in
34

APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND

QUASI-JUDICIAL

BODIES (Jinks et al. eds., 2014) (demonstrating how U.S. courts have been
interpreting international human rights law ever since the nation was founded).
3
Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d at 855; see Michael L. Perlin, "Strikingfor the
Guardiansand Protectorsof the Mind'- The Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilitiesand the Futureof GuardianshipLaw, 117 PENN ST. L. REV.
1159, 1178 n.97 (2013) (discussing Dameris L. in this context).

ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW

388

[Vol. 8

have also been considered by domestic courts." In Lareau v.
Manson,39 a federal district court cited to the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
standards in cases involving the "double bunking" of inmates;4 0 on
the other hand, in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., the
Second Circuit found that the United Nations' Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) did not convey a private right of action
to plaintiffs as a matter of law.4 1 In at least one case, however,
while noting that the non-ratified Convention was not binding on
U.S. courts, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court "read the
entire

text of the convention, . . .[and in an adoption

case]

conclude[d] that the outcome of the proceedings in [that] case
[were] completely in accord with principles expressed therein."42
Professor Christopher Slobogin has written carefully of the
potential impact of this Convention on the population with whom
we are concerned: persons currently incompetent to stand trial.43
In a recent paper (awaiting publication), he sets out the standard
state of the law on both criminal responsibility and incompetency,
and then says, in what will be startling to some, "[t]he
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD)
directs signatory States to undo all of this."44 He notes that
Article 14 of the CRPD states that "the existence of a disability
shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty,"4 5 and that Article
12 provides that States "shall recognize that persons with
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in
all aspects of life."46
These are, Slobogin notes, "radical provisions."4 7 He explains
that, as the official commentary to Article 14 states, under the
38 See, e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 257-58 (2d
Cir. 2003); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd
in part & rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
39 Lareau, 507 F. Supp. at 1177.
40 Id. at 1178 n.9.
41 See Flores, 414 F.3d at 258-59.
42 In re Adoption of Peggy, 767 N.E.2d 29, 38 (Mass. 2002).
43 Christopher Slobogin, Eliminating Mental Disabilityas a Legal Criterion
in Deprivation of Liberty Cases: The Impact of the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disability on the Insanity Defense, Civil Commitment, and
Competency Law (Vanderbilt Law Sch. Int'l J. L. & Psychiatry, Working Paper
No. 14-23, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2461279.
4 Id. at 1 (citation omitted).

45 Id.
46

47

Id.
Id. at 1-2.
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CRPD, "detention is 'unlawful' when it 'is grounded in the
combination between mental or intellectual disability and other
elements such as dangerousness or care and treatment.' 4 8
"[S]ince such measures are partly justified by the person's
disability, they are to be considered discriminatory and in
violation of the prohibition of deprivation of liberty on the
grounds of disability prescribed by article 14."'49 "[E]qual[ly]
dramatic[ally]," he adds, the official commentary to article 12
states that any law that 'allows the interdiction or declaration of
incapacity of persons on the basis of their mental, intellectual or
sensory impairment and the attribution to a guardian of the legal
capacity to act on their behalf conflicts with the recognition of
legal capacity of persons with disabilities enshrined in article
12.'o The commentary to that article calls for the abolition of
laws that violate 'the human right to legal capacity of persons
with disabilities,' it also endorses 'legal recognition of supported
decision-making, as the process whereby a person with a
disability is enabled to make and communicate decisions with
respect to personal or legal matters.""'

In short, Slobogin concludes:
[U]nder the CRPD, mental disability per se should play no role in
laws that deprive people of liberty (or of property or any other
significant interest).
Preventive detention and involuntary
treatment rules must be drafted so as to apply to everyone. People
with impaired decision-making abilities are to be assisted in, not
prevented from, making decisions, and if the decisions they make
violate a criminal law, they are to pay the consequences to the
extent everyone else does.52
Recently, in an article considering the role of mediation in
guardianship following the CRPD, Professor Jennifer L. Wright
48 Id. at 2 (quoting Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the
Secretary-General: Thematic Study by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights on Enhancing Awareness and Understanding
of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, T 48, UN Doc.
A/HRC/10/48 (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter OHCHR Thematic Report 2009]).
49 Slobogin, supra note 43, at 2 (quoting OHCHR Thematic Report 2009,
supra note 48, at 1 48).
50 Slobogin, supra note 43, at 2 (quoting OHCHR Thematic Report 2009
supra note 48, at T 45).
1' Slobogin, supra note 43, at 2 (quoting OHCHR Thematic Report 2009
supra note 48, at T 45).
52 Slobogin, supra note 43, at 3.
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underscored that the Committee's General Comment "rejected
substitute decision-making in any situation other than as a last
recourse when the disabled person's will and preferences simply
cannot be determined, despite intensive efforts."" And, even
more recently, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, an arm of the UN Office of the High
Commissioner on Human Rights, interpreted Article 14 toastoundingly, in our eyes-in this manner:
Detention of persons unfit to plead in criminal justice systems. The

committee has established that declarations of unfitness to stand
trial and the detention of persons based on that declaration is
contrary to article 14 of the convention since it deprives the person
of his or her right to due process and safeguards that are
applicable to every defendant. 54
These
How does all this relate to the issue at hand?
commentaries appear to counsel against any use of involuntary
medication for the purposes of making defendants competent to
stand trial, especially if there may be a question as to whether
the incompetency status as we know it remains valid. We
believe-and Slobogin believes-that it does (although it now
appears that an arm of the United Nations believes that it does
not), but the question of whether involuntarily medicating a
forensic patient" violates, in the words of the CRPD, the
"integrity of the person"" is, under any circumstances, an
important one that we must take seriously.
II. ON INCOME INEQUALITY
Let us shift gears now and move on to the other topic we wish
to explore: the extent to which our entire corpus of incompetency
to stand trial/involuntary medication law is, basically, a law that
53 Jennifer Wright, Making Mediation Work in GuardianshipProceedings:
Protectingand Enhancing the Voice, Rights, and Well-Being of Elders, J. INT'L
AGING L. &POL'Y (forthcoming 2014), available at
\http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2477111.
54 Statement on Article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS HuM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER (Sept. 2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=15183
&LanglD=E.
1 See generally Perlin & Schriver, supra note 19, at 203-04 (describing the
history of neglect, abuse, and improper forced treatments, such as "excessive
electroshock therapy," that forensic patients have had to endure).
56 A/Res/61/106, supra note 11, art. 17.
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applies only to the economically impoverished.
All cases in this area of the law take for granted-indeed, it is
never even discussed-that the defendant is in custody awaiting
trial and that, most likely, he has been transferred from a jail to a
maximum security forensic mental health facility." No one has
ever seriously challenged Professor Bruce Winick's assertion that
"the incompetency-to-stand-trial process has become a back-door
route to the mental hospital."" We have found no reported casenor have we even heard of an unreported case-in which a Sell
application to involuntarily medicate (or pre-Sell, a Charters
application, or any similar case-based application)-was sought
in a case in which the defendant was on bail.59 What happens,
then, when a defendant who is awaiting trial is not detained, but
is living within the community after making bail and the question
of competency arises?
As noted above, the Sell Court developed a four-pronged test to
determine whether the medication could be administered without
the individual's consent.6 0 Aside from the medication having to be
"medically appropriate" and "substantially unlikely to have side

&

" Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision over forty years ago in
Jackson v. Indiana, establishing time limits on a defendant's presumptive stay
in a maximum security hospital if he is not likely to regain his competence to
stand trial in the foreseeable future, in many jurisdictions, all defendants
thought to be incompetent to stand trial-no matter how trivial the underlying
charge-are mandatorily housed in such maximum security facilities, and the
issue of bail is often never raised. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
See Michael L. Perlin, "Forthe Misdemeanor Outlaw" The Impact of the ADA on
the Institutionalizationof CriminalDefendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA.
L. REV. 193, 201 (2000) ("As a matter of practice, defendants awaiting
evaluations to determine their competency to stand trial have regularly been
sent to maximum security forensic hospitals, regardless of the underlying
criminal charge, even though such hospitalization is often not necessary or may
even be counter-productive.").
58 Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty:
A Restated Proposaland a Response to ProfessorBonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 571, 591 n.102 (1995).
5 The only roughly parallel case is United States v. Colon from 2003. There,
a defendant's conditions of release on bail required that he be released to a
psychiatric hospital to receive antipsychotic medications, and the court found
that he posed a threat to society. United States v. Colon, No. 03 MAG
1328(LMS), 2003 WL 21730603, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2003). The court in
Colon, however, found it unnecessary to administer the Sell test when the
defendant was found to be a danger to himself or others. Id. at *4. See also
Kelly Hilgers & Paula Ramer, ForcedMedication of Defendants to Achieve Trial
Competency: An Update on the Law after Sell, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 813,
817-18 (2004) (for a discussion about Colon).
60 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003).
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effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial," the court
must also decide whether the restoration of competency is
necessary to further state interests, and whether it could be done
via alternative, less intrusive measures." Not insignificantly,
Sell followed by only four years the Supreme Court's decision in
Olmstead,62 applying the principle of the least restrictive
alternative to psychiatric hospitalization.6 3 There, the Court
ruled that people with mental disabilities had a qualified right to
community treatment.6 Moreover, treatment plans were to be
developed in the most integrated way possible, meaning that
community-based treatment, if the individual could (whether
independently or with help) live within his or her own
community, was the best course of action and would, ultimately,
foster a therapeutic approach that first considered the dignity
and integrity of each individual.6 5
What implications does this have for the question at hand? It
should come as no surprise that detainment and incarceration
can cause or exacerbate adverse mental health symptoms.6 6 Loss
of readily available access to a familial or community-based
support system, loss of freedom, and the lack of appropriate
treatment are some of the concerns that arise from being
detained in such unforgiving and hostile settings.
In addition to
Id. at 179-81.
Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 599, 607 (1999).
63 See id. at 599, 605-06; e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promisesof Paradise"Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate The Constitutional"LeastRestrictive
Alternative"Principlein Mental DisabilityLaw?, 37 HOuS. L. REV. 999, 1003
(2000).
6 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607. According to the Court, "[u]njustified isolation.
is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability[,]" and thus states
were ordered to maintain "a comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing
qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings[.]" Id. at
597, 605-06. The Supreme Court has also found that the Americans with
Disabilities Act applies to prisons. See Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S.
206, 209-10 (1998).
65 See generally Michael L. Perlin, "I
Ain't Gonna Work on Maggie's Farm No
More": InstitutionalSegregation, Community Treatment, the ADA, and the
Promise of Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 53, 77-78 (2000)
(describing Supreme Court Justices' opinions on community-based treatment
and treatment of the mentally disabled in general).
61

62

66 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MENTAL ILLNESS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND US PRISONs:
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW 3-4 (2009), available

at http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/22/mental-illness-human-rights-and-usprisons.
67 See, e.g., Aimee Meyer, A Legal Resource for the InternationalHuman
Rights Community: Column: InternationalUpdates - North America, 18 HUM.

2015]

"YOU MIGHT HAVE DRUGS AT YOUR COMMAND"

393

providing better quality of treatment, less restrictive alternatives
relieve the added stressors of incarceration, and detainment, as
they focus primarily on the individual's health and well-being
while promoting community integration; the individual can still
work, maintain housing, collect benefits, be close to family, and
collaborate with his or her attorney.6 8 Diversion programs and
alternative-to-incarceration options have further added to
progress and awareness in this area.6" For example, the creation
of mental health courts have-depending on their individual
circumstances and charges-given some defendants with a
mental illness or disability the opportunity to address their
mental health needs in the context of their current court cases in
attempts of both resolving the instant cases while providing the
necessary treatment so as to offer the best opportunity to help
stop the revolving door phenomenon that exists for many caught
between the criminal justice system and the community.70
While this is a start in re-conceptualizing the way mental
illness is seen within the context of the criminal justice system,
more work needs to be done. People with mental illnesses and
disorders are held longer in pre-trial detention than those not so
labeled." According to the Council of State Governments' Justice
Center, the average length of stay for inmates at New York City's
Department of Corrections is sixty-one days but almost double

&

RTs. BR. 30, 30 (2011); Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement
on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME
JUST. 441, 498 (2006). Generally, the best treatments available can be found in

community-based settings. James R. P. Ogloff et al., Mental Health Services In
Jails and Prisons:Legal, Clinical, and Policy Issues, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
109, 131 (1994).
68 See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE
PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR BAIL 13 (2012).
69 See, e.g., Amy Carter, Fixing Florida'sMental Health Courts:Addressing
the Needs of the Mentally Ill by Moving Away from Criminalizationto Investing
in Community Mental Health, 10 J.L. Soc'Y 1, 18-19 (2009).
70 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside": Mental
Health Courts, Dignity and Due Process, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL'Y J. 1, 9-13
(2013); Michael L. Perlin, "ThereAre No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden"` Mental
Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Dignity, and the Promise of TherapeuticJurisprudence,in COERCIVE CARE: LAW
AND POLICY 193, 206 (Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton eds., 2013).
" THE COUNCIL OF STATES GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, IMPROVING
OUTCOMES FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES INVOLVED WITH NEW YORK CITY'S
CRIMINAL COURT AND CORRECTION SYSTEMS 3 (2012), available at

http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CTBNYC-Court-Jail7cc.pdf.
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that (112 days) for those with a mental illness.72 Moreover, those
with a mental illness are less likely to obtain bail, and remain
detained an average of five times longer while waiting for bail to
be made than their counterparts."
It is also important to consider the power of sanism and
pretextuality in this entire inquiry. Sanism is "an irrational
prejudice of the same quality and character as other irrational
prejudices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing social
attitudes such as racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic
bigotry. . . [.]"74 Its corrosive effects have warped all aspects of
the criminal process." "'Pretextuality' means that courts accept
(either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage
in similarly dishonest (frequently meretricious) decision-making,
specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a
'high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to
achieve desired ends."'76
These factors have "poisoned and
corrupted" all of mental disability law," and we must keep this in
mind when we approach the issue of mental health as it relates to
incompetency and bail.
How does this relate to the instant matter? Almost all criminal
charges are bailable." Certainly, virtually all non-homicide, nonterrorism-related charges are. Interestingly, one of the factors to
be considered in a forced drugging analysis under Sell is whether

72
73

Id.
Id.

&

74 Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, 'All His Sexless Patients'" Persons
with Mental Disabilitiesand the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257,
259 (2014). See generally, Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped
Forth"- Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental DisabilityLaw
Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 3-4 (1999) (discussing how
sanism permeates all mental disability law).
7 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your
Funeral, My Trial" Global ClinicalLegal Education and the Right to Counsel in
Civil Commitment Cases, 28 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 241, 259 (2008).
76 Michael L. Perlin, "Things Have Changed"Looking at Non-Institutional
Mental DisabilityLaw Through The Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535,
536 (2003) (quoting Charles Sevilla, The ExclusionaryRule and Police Perjury,
11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 840 (1974).
n Michael L. Perlin, "She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl'" Neonaticide, The
Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of "OrdinaryCommon Sense', 10 WM.
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 17 (2003).
78 See Kurt X. Metzmeier, Preventive Detention:A Comparison of Bail Refusal
Practicesin the United States, England, Canadaand Other Common Law
Nations, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 399, 403-09 (1996) (for a helpful comparative
history).
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the crime is "serious,"" so the Sell court clearly "got" the fact that
involuntary medication might be sought in the full range of
criminal cases. Yet, none of the cases construing Sell involve
defendants in the community."o
We have known for 50 years-since Anne Rankin's
groundbreaking study"-the importance of bail decisions in
ultimate jury verdicts and, in the cases of convictions, on the
length of sentence.8 2 By way of example, pretrial detention may
falsely connote of guilt to jurors, which may ultimately, albeit it
at times subconsciously, sway their opinion of the defendant,
leading to a greater likelihood of conviction." This, combined
with sanism and pretextuality, has the potential to be
devastating to the defendant.84
As discussed earlier, jail settings, in and of themselves, pose a
unique set of risk factors not found in lesser restrictive settings.s
Jail environments exacerbate existing mental health problems

7 See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 2, § 8A-4.2c(1), at 25, 25 n. 369.53;
sources cited supra note 8; see also, e.g., United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401,
404, 410 (4th Cir. 2010) (nonviolent crimes of conspiracy, credit card fraud, and
identity theft were "serious" under Sell); United States v. Schloming, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 28919, at *12 (D.N.J. 2006); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supranote 2, § 8A4.2c(1), at 25 (noting how Schloming court "carefully teased out the meanings of
the different factors in Sell[] . . . . [and] looked carefully at each of the Sell
criteria," including the admonition that the crime must be "serious").
80 See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 2, § 8A-4.2c(1), at 27-30 n.369.41-369.58
(citing cases and articles applying Sell).
81 See Rankin, supra note 12, at 641, 655. Her work continues to be cited
today. See, e.g., Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor has no Clothes II. A
Proposalfor a More Serious Look at "The Weight of the Evidence," 7 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 84, 124 n.127 (2013); Samuel R. Wiseman, PretrialDetentionand the
Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1355 n.42 (2014).
82 See Wiseman, supra note 81, at 1355 (citing Douglas J. Klein, The Pretrial
Detention "Crisis:"The Causes and the Cure, 52 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 281, 293
(1997)) (noting how trend discovered by Rankin "has continued").
83 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 68, at 13.
84 The overwhelming majority of pretrial detainees with low-level
offenses
plead guilty to avoid continued jail time and/or potentially longer sentences. In
New York City alone, 99.6% of misdemeanor pleas end in guilty pleas. HUMAN

RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF Low
INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 31 (2010), available at

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usl2lOwebwcover O.pdf. Those
able to make bail, however, may feel less pressure to plead out as they are free
pretrial. "The desire to end the ordeal of the pretrial process-particularly
pretrial detention-pressures defendants to plead guilty and give up their right
to trial." Id.
8' See, e.g., Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, Rikers: Where Mental
Illness Meets Brutality in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2014, at Al.
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and cause new ones to manifest." Studies have shown that over
half of jail inmates have been diagnosed with a mental illness or
are receiving treatment for mental health-related issues." Jail
staff workers often have no education or training in the
appropriate treatment of detainees with a mental illness, and
thus may respond with aggressive measures that ultimately
exacerbate symptoms of their conditions." Many individuals with
a mental illness are disciplined or placed in solitary confinement,
rather than being afforded adequate treatment. 89 A person who
has made bail, however, has more opportunities to obtain
treatment and assist in his or her defense.
But there is nothing in the literature or the case law on the
specific issue one of the authors (MLP) raise in this paper. Here
is a hypothetical MLP regularly poses to his Criminal ProcedureAdjudication classes when discussing the topic of bail: imagine if
a multimillionaire real estate magnate were indicted and charged
with a serious criminal offense, and also had a major mental
illness, and easily made bail. And let's hypothesize further that it
became clear that, when that magnate came to court for pretrial
appearances, that his mental illness might reasonably affect his
competency to stand trial. His lawyer would most likely tell the
judge that his client was seeing a psychiatrist on "the street," and
was under his care.
And now let's hypothesize that that
psychiatrist prescribed medication for the magnate that he didn't
want to take. He could very likely pay his bill, walk out of the
office, and visit another psychiatrist to see whether he was any
happier with his prescription. Or maybe, he didn't want to take
drugs at all. Maybe he wanted to try cognitive behavior therapy.
In any event, there would be no connection via which the state
could mandate which medication that the defendant would
receive.
86 See U.S.: Number of Mentally Ill in Prisons Quadrupled, HuM. RTs.
WATCH
(Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/09/05/us-number-mentally-illprisons-quadrupled.
87 Id. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail:" Using
TherapeuticJurisprudenceto Remediate the Criminalizationof Persons with
Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 343, 343-45 (2012) (discussing the
staggering percentage of people with mental illness in prison and the
inadequate treatment these institutions provide).
88 Winerip & Schwirtz, supra note 85, at Al.
89 See, e.g., Stuart Grassian, PsychiatricEffects of Solitary Confinement, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 325, 328-29, 348 (2006); Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie
Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons:A Challenge
for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 104, 104-05 (2010).
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The courts have made it clear that we cannot have one set of
laws for the rich and one for the poor.90 Anatole France's famous
line-that the law "in .

.

. [its] majestic equality . . . forbid[s] rich

and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to
steal their bread""-has been frequently cited.9 2 Yet, we echo the
actions that France denounced in cases involving the drugging of
the
ever
considering
defendants
without
incompetent
discrimination inherent in such decisions.93 The bail system has
been criticized for decades as a means of punishing economic
inequality and enforcing class and race discrimination,
repudiating the goal of an unbiased and fair criminal justice
system.94 Those who are detained while awaiting trial and unable
to make bail face a unique set of circumstances when (or if) they
do reach a trial stage of their case. As previously discussed,
juries may presume heightened dangerousness for one who is
detained, using that false notion against the individual. One who
is in jail also may not have clothing available to him or her, and
could show up to their trial in jail-assigned clothes. Jumpsuits or
worn clothing could be misinterpreted as a client being disheveled
or, again, invoke a subconscious feeling of guilt.9 5
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the medication refusal
rights of forensic patients-those convicted of crime, those at trial
pleading the insanity defense, and those awaiting trial-is
doctrinally inconsistent, in large part, because of the totemic
significance to the Court of the defendant's status in the criminal
90 See, e.g., Sadhbh Walshe, America's Bail System: One Law for the Rich,
Another for Poor, GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/14/america-bail-system-

law-rich-poor (showing New York state's Chief Judge drawing attention to this
issue).
91 ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (1894).

92 See, e.g., People v. Rafalowitz, 993 N.Y.S.2d 645, 645 (Nassau Cty. Dist. Ct.
2014); Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection
Clause: Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REv. 909, 935
(2013) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE

AMERICAN UNION 459 (3d ed. 1874)) (Thomas Cooley's repetition of John Locke's
statement that legislators "'are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not
to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the
favorite at court and the countryman at plough.").
93 It goes without saying that, given racial income disparities, this policy has
a disparate impact on persons of color. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note

84, at 47; see also Perlin, supra note 34, at 311 (describing the racial
disproportionality present in juvenile detention facilities).
94 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 68, at 13.
95 Id.
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justice system.
We have referred to this previously as
"litigational side-effects."96 It is irrelevant to a person's blood
biochemistry if he has been convicted, is at trial or is currently
not fit to be tried; yet, the law on each of these is radically
different." Any sense that this might partially make-since
convicts are presumed to give up some of their civil rights upon
conviction,98 since prison security needs may trump civil
liberties,99 since a competent person at trial is presumed innocent
(even where the plea of insanity concedes the commission of the
actus reus)'"-disappears in the fact setting we are discussing
here. Let us also turn to therapeutic jurisprudence and consider
what that school of thought may have to offer us.
III. FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 0

One of the most important legal theoretical developments of
the past two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth
of therapeutic jurisprudence.' 0 2
Initially employed in cases
involving individuals with mental disabilities, but subsequently
Perlin, supra note 63, at 1019. On "litigational side-effects" in other areas
of the law, see, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?10
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623, 635-36 (1993) (discussing this concept in the
context of a "seemingly-benign anti-child abuse law").
9 Compare 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL, §§ 3B-8.2, 3B8.3 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing Harperand Riggins), with
PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 2, § 8A-4.2c(1), at 20-29 (discussing Sell). Harper,
Riggins and the pre-Sell case of United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 490
(4th Cir. 1987), rev'd & remanded en banc, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), are
compared and contrasted in PERLIN, supra, at § 3B-8.4.
98 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 220-21 (1990).
9 Compare id. at 223-24, with id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I
continue to believe that 'even the inmate retains an unalienable interest in
liberty-at the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity-which the
Constitution may never ignore[.]' (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
100 See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127,135 (1992) ("Pretrial detainees,
who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional
rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners") (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).
1o' Perlin, supra note 37, at 1183; Perlin & Lynch, supra note 19, at 37.
102 Perlin, supra note 34, at 330. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER,
96

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 14 (1990);
BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 8
(2005); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,24 TOURO

L. REV. 17, 18 (2008); PERLIN, supra note 2, § 2D-3, at 534-41. Wexler first used
the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in
1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence,16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 32-33 (1992).
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expanded far beyond that narrow area, therapeutic jurisprudence
presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and
legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law that
can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.'
The
ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine
whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should
be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not
subordinating due process principles.'" There is an inherent
tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifies how it
must be resolved: "the law's use of 'mental health information to
improve therapeutic functioning cannot impinge upon justice
concerns.""o
As one of us (MLP) has written elsewhere, "an
inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic
concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties."'06
Therapeutic jurisprudence "asks us to look at law as it actually
impacts people's lives"' and focuses on the law's influence on
emotional life and psychological well-being.'o It suggests that
"law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid
03 See Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91, 97 (Ian
Freckelton & Kate Peterson eds., 2006) (for a transnational perspective); see also
Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged With Great Skill": How
Will JurorsRespond To NeuroimagingTestimony In Insanity Defense Cases?, 42
AKRON L. REV 885, 912 (2009); Perlin, supra note 34, at 330.
104 Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain":
Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons InstitutionalizedBecause of
Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitalsand in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 510
n.139 (2008); Perlin, supra note 34, at 330. On how therapeutic jurisprudence
"might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a means of
'strip[ping] bare the law's sanist fagade,"' see Michael L. Perlin, "Baby, Look
Inside Your Mirror"- The Legal Profession's Willful And Sanist Blindness To
Lawyers With Mental Disabilities,69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 591 (2008) (quoting
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 301
(2000)); see also Ian Freckelton, TherapeuticJurisprudenceMisunderstood and
Misrepresented:The Priceand Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575,
585 (2008); Bernard P. Perlmutter, George's Story: Voice and Transformation
through the Teaching and Practiceof Therapeutic Jurisprudencein a Law
School Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 599 n.111 (2005).
05 Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline" Mental
DisabilityLaw, Theory and Practice, "Us" and "Them", 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 775,
782 (1998).
106 Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000);
Perlin, supra note 105, at 782.
107 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword:Therapeutic JurisprudencePerspectiveson
Dealing with Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
1os David B. Wexler, PracticingTherapeutic Jurisprudence:Psychological Soft
Spots and Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW ASA
HELPING PROFESSION 45, 45 (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2006).
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imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and
when consistent with other values served by law should attempt
to bring about healing and wellness."'"
Therapeutic jurisprudence "is a tool for gaining a new and
distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological insights into
the law and its applications.""o It is also part of a growing
comprehensive movement in the law towards establishing more
humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal
issues collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully."' In its aim to
use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and promote
well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been described as "a
sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law a movement
towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of
law which emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial
triumphalism."" 2 That is, therapeutic jurisprudence supports an
ethic of care."'
One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is a
commitment to dignity." 4 Professor Amy Ronner describes the
"three Vs": voice, validation and voluntariness,"' arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a
sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If
that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to,
heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a
sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding
with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with
the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary
109 Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic JurisprudenceModel for Civil Commitment,
in INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds.,

2003).

Freckelton, supra note 104, at 577.
Perlin, supra note 34, at 332.
112 Id.
111 See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door?A
"Therapeutic"Approachto EnrichingClinical Legal Education Comes Calling,
28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006); David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper:
An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's Concerns about
Therapeutic JurisprudenceCriminalDefense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597,
599 (2007); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic
Jurisprudencein Law School Clinical Education:Transforming the Criminal
Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-07 (2006).
114 Perlin, supra note 34, at 333.
"s Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-HelplessLawyer: Clinical Legal Education
and TherapeuticJurisprudenceas Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 ToURo L.
REV. 601, 627 (2008).
0
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participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding
as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants
that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered
the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their
own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior
in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel
that they11 6are making, or at least participating in, their own
decisions.

The question to be posed here is this: to what extent do our
pretrial drugging practices comport with TJ principles? To what
extent do they comply with Professor Ronner's aspirations that
the "3 V's"-voluntariness, voice and validation'"-be present in
all matters? Forcing involuntary medication cuts against the
very concept of therapeutic jurisprudence,"'
and certainly
violates "the 3 Vs" articulated by Professor Ronner, and loses
sight of the person's integrity." 9
Importantly, this notion of
personal integrity is also protected by the CRPD.12 0
No citations are needed to support the assertion that a dual
track system-one for rich persons and one for poor personsviolates the tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence.
The fact of
seeking to refuse medication in a jail setting can exacerbate the
danger of the jail environment in and of itself. Jail inmates
relatively tell advocates that, although they might be amenable to
medication within the community, they resist taking medication
because it could make them more vulnerable and targeted within
116 Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence,Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94-95
(2002).
'" Perlin, supra note 34, at 333.
"1 See Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the Civil
Rights of InstitutionalizedMentally DisabledPersons: Hopeless Oxymoron or
Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 80, 110-11 (1995):
The right to refuse treatment has a strong therapeutic jurisprudence

component. Although public attention has been focused primarily on
what is often seen as the antitherapeutic aspect of this right, we
believe that there are significant benefits here as well: due process
rights for the mentally disabled, better checks on doctors and clinical
staff to ensure that medication and other treatment are not being
administered as a means of punishment or convenience, and improved

protection from administration of inappropriate medications or
medications causing severe side effects, among others.
"' See, e.g., Steele v. Hamilton Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d
10, 15 (Ohio 2000) ("The right to refuse medical treatment is a fundamental
right in our country, where personal security, bodily integrity, and autonomy

are cherished liberties.").
120 See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 34, at 305.
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a correctional facility.'21 Those with a mental illness or disability
tend to be more likely to experience acts of abuse and violenceby both other inmates and correctional officers, placing them in
harm's way.' 22 Given that side-effects of antipsychotic medication
may make them less aware of their surroundings, more sluggish
and apathetic'23 (and thus less able to defend themselves),
defendants, naturally, want to keep themselves as safe as
possible while in a jail setting.
A dual track system robs a significant percentage of criminal
defendants of their "voice." While bailed defendants have the
right to exercise "voluntary" choice in deciding whether to take
drugs or, if they do decide to, what drugs to take, such
voluntariness is entirely missing in the cases of economically
disadvantaged defendants who cannot afford bail. And in that
context, there is no validation at all of their wishes. In short, our
current scheme utterly violates therapeutic jurisprudence
principles.
How can this be remedied? First, we need to acknowledge that
this reality exists. Second, we need to radically rethink the

121

Personal communications with Meredith Schriver, M.A.

122 DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1, 5

(2006).
23 See Michael L. Perlin, And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't
Even Say
What It Is I've Got: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse
Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 749 n.92 (2005):
The Supreme Court has explicitly linked the possibility of side effects
to the rationale for Constitutional due process protections in right to
refuse cases. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229-30 (1990)
("It is also true that the drugs can have serious, even fatal, side effects
tardive dyskinesia, perhaps the most discussed side effect of
antipsychotic drugs is irreversible in some cases, and is characterized
by involuntary, uncontrollable movements of various muscles,
especially around the face."); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137
(1992) ("It was suggested that the dosage administered to the
defendant was within the toxic range, and could make him 'uptight' or
make him suffer from drowsiness or confusion. It is clearly possible
that such side effects had an impact upon not just defendants' outward
appearance, but also the content of his testimony, his ability to follow
the proceedings, or the substance of his communication with
counsel."); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 185 (2003) ("Whether a
particular drug will tend to sedate a defendant, interfere with
communication with counsel, prevent rapid reaction to trial
developments, or diminish the ability to express emotions are matters
important in determining the permissibility of medication to restore
competence.").
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concept of "least restrictive alternative" in the Sell context.' 2 4 We
believe that courts must consider what alternatives would be
available if a defendant were in the community, and weigh these
alternatives as part of any Sell assessment.1 2 5 Third, courts must
acknowledge that the Americans with Disabilities Actl 26 requires
a consideration of potential pre-trial alternatives in the case of
As long as many
currently-incompetent criminal defendants.
states demand that such defendants be housed in maximum
security facilities-no matter how serious or trivial their criminal
charges-it is unlikely that there will be any meaningful change
in the status quo. Just as a rule that all incompetent to stand
trial defendants must be housed in such facilities violates the
ADA, so does a dual track system that establishes significant
limitations on the right of some defendants to refuse treatment
(or to be given a meaningful voice in the selection of their own
treatment) but imposes no such restrictions on another cohort
(those that can afford bail). Finally, our current practices fly in
the face of therapeutic jurisprudence principles.
CONCLUSION

We have sought to focus on two seemingly-unrelated issues
that have potentially huge impacts on the IST/forced drugging
process: the application of international human rights law and
the impact of economic inequality. There is little or nothing in
the legal literature on either topic, but we believe that we must
turn our attention to both if we are to make significant progress
in understanding the litigational side-effects of the Sell decision,
and recognizing the future impact of international human rights
law-especially in the context of the CRPD-on this area of law
and policy. Sell has spawned a cottage industry of scholarly
commentary, and has been cited in 557 reported cases.'2 7 We
124 See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003); In re Guardianship of
Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S. 2d 848, 853 (Sur. Ct. 2012).
125 See generally Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (noting that less intrusive measures
must be considered before involuntary treatment); Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring,
527 U.S. 581, 606 (1999) (finding a right to community treatment where it is
feasible).
126 See generally Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promises by the Hour": Sex, Drugs,
the ADA, and PsychiatricHospitalization,46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947, 950, 955, 973
(1997) (noting the interplay between the ADA and involuntary medication
issues).
27
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believe, though, that it is time for us to consider both of the
factors discussed in this paper from the perspectives of human
rights, due process, civil liberties and therapeutic jurisprudence.
Writing about Bob Dylan in the context of the civil rights
movement, Charles Hughes has concluded that Gotta Serve
Somebody, the song from which the first part of the title is taken,
"foregrounds themes of personal choice and responsibility."' 28 If
we begin to take more seriously the themes of international
human rights law and income equality, then, perhaps, in the
substantive context of this paper, these "personal choices" will
finally be honored.

128 Charles Hughes, Allowed to Be Free: Bob Dylan and the Civil Rights
Movement, in HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED: BOB DYLAN'S ROAD FROM MINNESOTA TO
THE WORLD 43, 55 (Colleen J. Sheehy & Thomas Swiss eds., 2009).

